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Abstract
We introduce explicitly the eﬀort as a choice variable in a continuous
time utility maximisation framework of an executive who is partly com-
pensated with stock options. We solve the model in the case where the
executive is not allowed to trade in the company’s stock but is able to
achieve a partial insurance through trading in a correlated market port-
folio. We define the executive’s value of the options through a certainty
equivalence approach both in the case of European call options and non-
standard capped stock options and study the behaviour of the reservation
price as relevant parameters change.
JEL G13, G30, G32, J33, M12
Key words : incentives, executive stock options, unhedgeable risks, util-
ity maximisation, non-standard options compensation.
∗E-mail addresses: agliardi@economia.unibo.it (E. Agliardi), anderga@economia.unibo.it
(R. Andergassen).
1
1 Introduction
Executive stock options have become increasingly popular. Murphy (1999) doc-
uments that stock option based compensation increased during the last decade
at the cost of base salaries in all US sectors, except in the utilities. The debate
about executive compensation structures has recently reemerged at the inter-
national level, following on the controversial cases such as Enron, Worldcom
and others. In principle, the rising importance of stock option compensation
for executives is justified by incentive eﬀects: stock option compensation can be
highly eﬀective in aligning corporate oﬃcers’ incentives with those of sharehold-
ers. Regrettably, some perverse eﬀects on the quality of corporate disclosures
may also emerge whenever such compensations plans do not provide the right
incentives. In some cases, executives might adopt strategies to aﬀect firm’s eval-
uation. Moreover, in the current accountings the failure to include the value
of most stock options grants as executives compensation and hence, to sub-
tract them from pretax profits, has increased reported earnings and presumably
stock prices. In response, an appropriate compensation plan is called for ,both
to provide the right incentives and to filter out market wide performance so that
executives will not be rewarded because of a bull market.
Some have argued that Black-Scholes option pricing, the prevailing means
of estimating options, is approximate and is not a good estimate of the value
that is transferred to the executive. The Black-Scholes option price is claimed
to overstate the value of the options to the executive and consequently it over-
states also their incentives (see Lambert et al, 1991; Kulatilaka and Marcus,
1994; Huddart, 1994; Detemple and Sundaresan, 1999; Hall and Murphy, 2000;
Henderson 2002). All these papers define the value of the options to the execu-
tive based on a certainty equivalence approach. They assume that the executive
cannot short sell and therefore cannot hedge exposure: because of such trading
restrictions, there will be a wedge in the valuation of the stock option by the
executive and the firm, namely, the executive values the option less than the
cost to the company.
Johnson and Tian (2000) define incentives of the standard executive stock
options as the derivative of the option value (defined by the Black-Scholes for-
mula) with respect to the underlying asset price, i.e. the Black-Scholes delta.
Thus, incentives are larger and the executive’s eﬀort is larger, the larger is
delta. But since the Black-Scholes value overstates the executive value, also the
incentives based on this computation will overstate the true incentives.
Hall and Murphy (2002) and Henderson (2002) consider incentives as the
derivative of the utility based evaluation of the options with respect to the asset
price: in this way, they try to capture the executive’s incentive to influence the
firm’s stock price through his actions.
In this paper we tackle again the issue of the value and incentive eﬀects of
stock option compensation. We extend the continuous time utility maximisation
model proposed by Henderson (2002) by introducing the eﬀort of executives
explicitly. Akin to the static model proposed by Jenter (2001) we explicitly
introduce eﬀort as a choice variable for the executive. In particular, we will
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assume that the executive is able to increase the long run drift of the asset price
through an increase in the eﬀort. Thus, the larger is the eﬀort, the larger will be
the drift of the asset price and consequently the larger is the value of the options.
On the other hand, a larger eﬀort reduces the utility of the executive directly.
Thus, the executive solves this trade-oﬀ by choosing the optimal amount of
eﬀort in each period of time.
We calculate explicitly the optimal eﬀort and the option value for the ex-
ecutive for two types of compensation plans: the case of a standard European
call option and the case of a non-standard capped stock option, which has the
property that the recipient can benefit from the increase of the underlying asset
price only up to a predetermined barrier. This latter plan seems indeed to be
more appropriate to filter out market wide performance. Moreover, we study
the behaviour of the reservation price as relevant parameters change for both
cases and find suﬃcient conditions such that non-standard capped stock options
are more appealing than standard call options.
The remaining part of this paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we
outline the basics of the model and find the reservation price for the two contin-
gent claims. In Section 3 we study the case of standard European call options,
while in Sections 4 we study the case of non-standard capped stock options.
Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
We consider an executive receiving a claim on the company’s stock S on which
trading is not allowed. The executive can take positions in the market portfolio
M , the dynamics of which are assumed to follow:
dM
M
= µdt+ σdB
where B is a Wiener process. Under appropriate measure, it can be written as
dM
M
= rdt+ σdBo
where Bo is a Wiener process, Bo = B + µ−rσ t and r is the riskless rate of
return. We assume that the dynamics of the company’s stock S are given by
the following
dS
S
= (ν + αf) dt+ η
³
ρdB +
p
1− ρ2dW
´
where W is a Wiener process independent of B, f is the executive’s eﬀort and
α indicates the ability of the executive to influence the drift of the company’s
stock. Further, we assume that the eﬀort level is not observable by the principal.
The risk component of the stock can be split into the market or systematic
risk η2ρ2 and the firm-specific or non-systematic risk η2
¡
1− ρ2
¢
. Thus, for
ρ = 0 all the risk is firm-specific, while for | ρ |= 1 all the risk is market specific.
Since the executive is not allowed to trade in the company’s stock he cannot
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construct a riskless portfolio. Thus, if ρ = 1 the risk can be diversified away,
while if ρ = 0 the risk cannot be hedged away. As long as | ρ |< 1 the executive
is able to reach a partial insurance by market trading.
The executive faces a portfolio allocation problem. In particular, he has to
determine the amount of wealth he wants to invest in the market portfolio and
the amount of wealth he wants to invest in the riskless asset. Let θ denote the
amount of wealth X to be invested in the market portfolio; consequently, X− θ
denotes the amount the executive wants to invest in the riskless asset yielding
an interest rate r. Thus,
dX = θ
dM
M
+ r (X − θ) dt
and after rearranging terms
dX = θσdB + θ (µ− r) dt+ rXdt
The executive receives λ ≥ 0 units of a stock option whose payoﬀ is h (ST ).
In what follows we will consider two special cases: a) a standard European call
option, i.e. h (ST ) = (ST −K)+and b) a non-standard capped stock option
(see Agliardi, 2002), i.e. h (ST ) = Min
h
(ST −K)+ , S¯ −K
i
, where S¯ > K is
fixed. In the case of capped options we have that 0 6 h (ST ) 6 S¯ −K, i.e. the
payoﬀ is bounded, while in the case of call options h (ST ) > 0, i.e. the payoﬀ is
unbounded from above.
We assume that the eﬀort exerted by the executives reduces his utility. Thus,
eﬀort represents a disutility. In particular, we assume that the disutility of
eﬀort is increasing in eﬀort and convex. In order to keep the model analytically
tractable, we also assume that the utility function is additively separable in
wealth and eﬀort.
The executive has two choice variables: the optimal amount of wealth in-
vested in the market portfolio and the optimal level of eﬀort. His value function
is given by
V (t,Xt, St;λ) = sup
(θu,fu)u> 0
Et
µ
U
µ
XT − β
f2t
2
t+ λh (ST )
¶¶
(1)
Using the assumption of CARA utility function, i.e. U (x) = − 1γ e
−γx, γ > 0
we can rewrite (1) as follows
V (t,Xt, St;λ) = −
1
γ
e
−γ
µ
er(T−t)Xt−β
f2t
2 t
¶
g (T − t, logSt) (2)
where g (0, logST ) = eλγh(ST ).
The following restrictions on the values of the parameters α and β are re-
quired in order to obtain an admissible solution in the case of standard European
call options.
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Assumption 1 Let α
2
β < (1− ρ2)γη2 for h (ST ) = (ST −K)
+
In Proposition 1 we state the solution for the optimal strategy (θ∗t , f
∗
t ).
Proposition 1 Let Assumption 1 hold. The optimal strategy (θ∗t , f∗t ) is given
by
θ∗t =
(µ−r)g+gSσηρ
γer(T−t)gσ2
f∗t = −αgSβγg
(3)
where g (T − t, logSt) = e−
(µ−r)2
2σ2
(T−t)
h
E0
³
e−
γλ
b h(Ste
Ωt)
´ib
, b = 1
1−ρ2− α2
γβη2
,
Ωt =
¡
ν − ηρσ (µ− r)−
1
2η
2
¢
(T − t) + ηzt and zt is a Brownian motion.
Proof. Applying Ito to (2) we have that the deterministic terms are
−er(T−t)γθ (µ− r) g + 12γ
2
¡
er(T−t)
¢2
θ2σ2g − γer(T−t)θσρηgS+
+γ f
2
2 gβ − gt + gS
¡
ν + αf − 12η2
¢
+ 12gSSη
2 = 0
(4)
Maximising (4) over θ and f we obtain (3). Substituting (3) back into (4) and
rearranging terms we obtain the following pde:
−gt + gS
¡
ν − 12η2
¢
+ 12gSSη
2 − α2 g
2
S
2gβγ+
− [(µ−r)g+gSσηρ]
2
2gσ2 = 0
(5)
Following Zariphopoulou (2001) and Henderson and Hobson (2002) we make the
substitution g (τ , y) = eδτG (τ , y + φτ)b. Using δ = − (µ−r)
2
2σ2 , φ = ν− η
ρ(µ−r)
σ −
1
2η
2, τ = T − t and b = 1
1−ρ2− α2
γβη2
(5) reduces to the pde
Gτ =
1
2
η2GSS (6)
subject to G (0, y) = e−
γλ
b h(e
y).
The fundamental solution to (6) is
w (τ , y) =
1p
2πη2τ
e−
y2
2η2τ
where
R +∞
−∞ w (τ , y) dy = 1. Thus,
G (τ , y) = E (G (0, y + ηz))
where z is a Brownian motion. Substituting this last expression back into g (τ , y)
we obtain the result stated in Proposition 1.
Notice that the structure of f∗ is very similar to the incentives derived in
Henderson (2002). For small values of λ we observe that the incentives are
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increasing in αβ and vanish to the first order as λ.tends to 0. Thus, for λ = 0 we
have that incentives are zero. The intuition for this result is that if the executive
does not receive any contigent claim, then it is optimal not to exert any eﬀort
since eﬀort represents a disutility. Observe that ∂f∗/∂η < 0, that is, incentives
decrease with volatility. Moreover, ∂f∗/∂ρ < 0.
Given an initial wealth x, the reservation price p is defined implicitly as
V (0, x− p, S;λ) = V (0, x, S; 0)
Straightforward computation allows us to get Proposition 2:
Proposition 2 The reservation price p is given by
pt = −
b
γ
e−r(T−t) logE0
h
e−
λγ
b h(Ste
Ωt)
i
− 1
2
βe−r(T−t)f2t t (7)
where ft can be computed as from (3).
In the next sections we will make use of the following assumption.
Assumption 2 α = α0
p
1− ρ2
Assumption 2 states that the executive’s ability to influence the long run
drift of the company’s asset depends on ρ. In particular, if ρ = 0, i.e. all the
risk is firm specific, the executive is most eﬃcient in influencing the dynamics
of the asset. Thus, ρ indicates the eﬃciency of the action of the executive in
influencing the dynamics of the asset.
3 Standard European Call options
The cost of each option for the firm is given by the Black-Scholes formula
c (S, t) = e−r(T−t)E0 (ST −K)+, while the value the executive attaches to a
single option is given by pλ , where p can be computed by (7) with h(Ste
Ωt) =
(SteΩt −K)+.The diﬀerence between the cost of the option and the value the
executive attaches to the single option is known as the deadweight cost and is
defined by c (S, t)− pλ .
In order to study the behaviour of the reservation price, we take a second
order approximation for low values of λ:
pt
λ ≈ e−r(T−t)
n
E0
¡
SteΩt −K
¢+ − λ2 ¡1− ρ2¢ α02β ×
×
·
γ
³
β
α02 −
1
γη2
´
E0
h¡
SteΩt −K
¢+i2
+ t
¸¾ (8)
We are able to recover in this case the result stated in Henderson (2002) that
the reservation price converges towards the cost of the option if ρ → 1. This
result is stated formally in the following Corollary.
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Corollary 1
1. pλ −→ρ→1 c (S, t)
2. f∗t −→ρ→1 0
Corollary 1 states that if all the risk becomes insurable, then the reservation
price per unit of option converges towards the cost of each option. Thus, as
ρ→ 1, the deadweight cost converges towards zero. This is a direct consequence
of the result that the eﬀort f∗t converges towards zero as all the risk becomes
insurable.
Part 2) of Corollary 1 states that as ρ → 1, the level of eﬀort f∗t converges
towards zero. This result is not because of vanishing incentives, but because
of the vanishing ability of influencing the dynamics of the company’s asset, i.e.
α→ 0.
We are interested in the behaviour of the reservation price as ρ changes:
∂
∂ρ
¡pt
λ
¢
≈ e−r(T−t)
n
∂
∂ρE
0
¡
SteΩt −K
¢+
+
+λρα
02
β
·
γ
³
β
α02 −
1
γη2
´
E0
h¡
SteΩt −K
¢+i2
+ t
¸
+
−λ2γ
¡
1− ρ2
¢ ³
1− α02βγη2
´
∂
∂ρE
0
h¡
SteΩt −K
¢+i2 (9)
We observe that the first term of (9) is negative, while the second and third
terms are positive. If the first term dominates the other eﬀects, then the reser-
vation price is decreasing in ρ and consequently ptλ > c (S, t) . In particular, for
suﬃciently small values of λ we have that ptλ > c (S, t).
Consider the eﬀect of a change in the volatility η2 on the reservation price
pt
λ . Taking the first derivative of the reservation price with respect to η
2 we
obtain
∂
∂η2
¡pt
λ
¢
≈ e−r(T−t)
n
∂
∂η2E
0
¡
SteΩt −K
¢+
+
−λ2
¡
1− ρ2
¢
α02
β
³
1
η2
´2
E0
h¡
SteΩt −K
¢+i2
+
−λγ
¡
1− ρ2
¢ ³
1− α02β
1
γη2
´
∂
∂η2E
0
h¡
SteΩt −K
¢+i2 (10)
We observe that the first term and the second term of (10) are negative, while
the third term is positive. If the first two terms dominate the third one, then
the reservation price is decreasing in η2. In particular, for λ suﬃciently small we
have that ∂∂η2
¡pt
λ
¢
6 0, that is, the executive prefers less volatile environments.
These results are summarised in the following Corollary
Corollary 2 For λ suﬃciently small we have that:
a) ∂∂ρ
¡pt
λ
¢
6 0
b) ptλ > c (S, t)
c) ∂∂η2
¡pt
λ
¢
6 0
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Finally, we get ∂∂γ
¡pt
λ
¢
6 0, that is, higher risk aversion let the executive
place a lower value on options.
4 Non-standard capped stock options
The payoﬀ structure of a capped option is, by definition, bounded. Observe that
as long as b > 0 the payoﬀ structure remains concave, while for b < 0 we have
that the payoﬀ structure becomes convex. We will see that this has important
implications.
From Agliardi (2002) we know that the cost of the capped stock option for the
firm cˆ (S, t) is lower than the cost of a standard call option, i.e. cˆ (S, t) < c (S, t).
This result is because of the limitation in potential returns.
Taking a second order approximation of the reservation price for small values
of λ we get
pˆt
λ ≈ e−r(T−t)
n
E0Min
¡
SteΩt −K
¢+
, S¯ −K]− λ2
¡
1− ρ2
¢
α02
β ×
×
·
γ
³
β
α02 −
1
γη2
´
E0
h
Min
h¡
SteΩt −K
¢+
, S¯ −K
ii2
+ t
¸¾
We can state the following Corollary:
Corollary 3
1. pˆλ −→ρ→1 cˆ (S, t)
2. f∗t −→ρ→1 0
Corollary 3 states that if all the risk becomes insurable, then the reservation
price per unit of option converges towards the cost of each option. Thus, as
ρ → 1, the deadweight cost converges towards zero. Furthermore, incentives
and the eﬀort become vanishing small as ρ increases towards 1.
Corollary 4
A suﬃcient condition for pˆλ ≥ cˆ (S, t) to be true is either
1. γ
³
1
γη2 −
β
α02
´
E0
h
Min
h¡
SteΩt −K
¢+
, S¯ −K
ii2
> t , or
2. λ suﬃciently small .
Observe that at time t = 0, Corollary 4, Part 1), is always satisfied, if
b < 0, i.e. α02 > γβη2, and consequently at the initial time the executive
values the capped options more than they cost the firm. Condition α02 > γβη2
states that the executives ability to influence the drift of the company’s asset
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is suﬃciently large. Thus, at the initial time the company finds capped options
more attractive than call options since the former lead to a negative deadweight
loss.
Comparing capped options with standard call options, the possibility that
b < 0 in the case of capped options increases the probability that the reservation
price is larger than the cost of the option.
To summarize the comparison between capped stock options and standard
call options we observe that the former are much cheaper than the latter and
further, the probability of observing a negative deadweight cost is larger in the
case of capped options than in the case of call options.
In order to make a comparison between the two compensations we provide
numerical simulations, in the case where we vary the number of options granted
by the firm such that the total cost of the two portfolios is the same. In partic-
ular, we fix the number of call options granted λ and consequently the number
of capped stock options is λc(S,t)cˆ(S,t) . In Figure 1 and 2 we provide numerical simu-
lations of the value the executive attaches at time t = 0 to call options (dashed
line) and to capped stock options (continuous line) as a function of ρ. The value
of the parameters we used in the simulations are: r = 0.05, S0 = K = 100,
µ = 0.1, τ = 8, σ = 0.35, γ = 4107 , λ = 25.000 and 1−
α02
βγη2 = 0.5.
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
1.05´ 106
1.1´ 106
1.15´ 106
1.2´ 106
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
1.05´ 106
1.1´ 106
1.15´ 106
1.2´ 106
Figure 1: η = 0.2; LHS S¯ = 220 and RHS S¯ = 420.
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
1.1´ 106
1.2´ 106
1.3´ 106
1.4´ 106
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
1.05´ 106
1.1´ 106
1.15´ 106
1.2´ 106
1.25´ 106
1.3´ 106
1.35´ 106
Figure 2: η = 0.4; LHS S¯ = 220 and RHS S¯ = 420.
From Figures 1 and 2 we observe that capped stock options lead to a larger
reservation price than standard European call options.
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5 Conclusion
We solved the continuous time maximisation problem of an executive who is par-
tially compensated with either European call options or non-standard capped
stock option. Optimal eﬀort, optimal portfolio and the option value for the
executive are derived in the case where he is not allowed to trade in the com-
pany’s stock but where he can achieve partial insurance through trading in a
correlated market portfolio. For both types of options we studied the behaviour
of the reservation price as relevant parameters change and showed conditions
under which the executive values the options more than they cost the firm.
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